The purpose of this paper is to investigate wage structures of professional workers in the Israeli labor market, using data from the most recent 1995 Census and correcting for selectivity at the stage of entrance into the occupation. The sample of professionals is decomposed into several subsamples: men and women and within each gender a distinction is made between Easterners (origination from Asian/African countries) and Westerners (from European/American countries of origin). Comparisons by gender and ethnicity can then be made. Characteristics (endowments) and wage structures of the four groups are presented. Wage equations include the Inverse of Mill's Ratio as a regressor to correct for selection into the professional occupations. Wage differences are then examined and decomposed into 3 components: Endowments (human capital), discrimination and selectivity. Following the methodology presented in Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) , four alternative decompositions are suggested and discussed.
I. Introduction
Wage equations for both genders, wage differentials and segregation have been studied intensively since the 1960s. Research has been carried out on theoretical aspects, estimation methodologies, econometric issues and empirical estimation. A comprehensive review of the literature is beyond the scope of this paper. To mention but a few studies: a series of papers edited by Asplund in Pereira (1999) on gender wage equations in 15 European countries; and Blau and Kahn (2003) , who investigated international differences in gender in European countries. Polachek (1975 Polachek ( , 1976 Polachek ( , 1979 Polachek ( , 1994 ) leads a group of economists who use human capital theories to explain gender wage differentials and segregation, and Bergmann (1974 Bergmann ( , 1986 Bergmann ( , 1996 another group emphasizing discrimination. Clearly, different explanations for the source of gender differences lead to different policies for combatting women's inferiority in the labor market. While human capital theories favor increasing investment in women's education, training and selection of occupational path, discriminative theories call for affirmative action, laws against discrimination, and the like. Rather than being competitive, these two theories are complementary. There are difference in human capital levels (mainly in experience and training) and discrimination is also prevalent (measured by different rates of return to human capital). Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) were the first to suggest a methodology for estimating the contributions of human capital differences and of discrimination to gender (racial or ethnic) wage differentials.
Typically, one uses the separately estimated (log) wage equations for two groups of workers to decompose the difference in their (geometric) mean wages into a discrimination (unexplained) portion and a human capital (endowments or explained) portion. The simplest decomposition procedure is to adopt one of the estimated wage structures as the nondiscriminatory norm. Often researchers select the wage structure for the group of workers believed to be dominant in the labor market (at least 1 relative to the comparison group). One implication of this procedure is that all of the discriminatory wage differential is ascribed to underpayment of the subordinate group rather than to overpayment of the dominant group. A more general approach to wage decompositions is found in Neumark (1988) , Oaxaca and Ransom (1988) , and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) . In the more general approach the nondiscriminatory wage structure is estimated from a pooled sample of the two demographic groups.
This approach allows the discrimination component to be further disaggregated into overpayment (favoritism) and underpayment (pure discrimination).
Refinements in measuring labor market discrimination and endowment differences incorporate the gender and ethnic compositions of each occupation as determinants of occupational wages: Hirsch and Macpherson (1994) , Hirsch and Schumacher (1992) , and Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) . Panel data techniques are used to control for occupational characteristics and unmeasured worker characteristics encompassing skill and tastes. In another set of studies the contribution of occupational segregation to the wage differential was estimated separately so that the difference between the wages of the groups under consideration was now decomposed into three components: the endowment component, wage discrimination, and segregation. Examples of such papers are Brown et al. (1980) , Miller (1987) , Reilly (1991) , and Neuman and Silber (1996) .
Another set of papers explores econometric issues, such as selectivity bias. Selectivity bias might be found at two stages of the employment process: at the stage of joining the employed labor force and when a specific occupation or an occupational status (e.g. union/nonunion) is chosen. Occupational selectivity bias affects wage differentials as occupations differ in average wage rates (even after controlling for workers' characteristics) and barriers to entrance of the subordinate group create another source of discrimination. In the presence of sample selection, of both types, OLS estimation of the wage equations can yield biased and inconsistent estimators, Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1976 Heckman ( , 1979 . While correction for the first type is standard, correction for the second type is not usually done, and if it is performed it is not taken to the stage of decomposing wage differentials including the decomposition of the Inverse Mills Ratio. Reimers (1983) and Boymond et.al. (1994) estimate the effects of labor market discrimination, correcting for sample selection bias in a rather simplistic way. Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) show that sample selection complicates the interpretation of wage decompositions. They offer several alternative decompositions, each based on different assumptions and objectives. Section II presents a brief description of the decomposition of selectivity corrected wage equations.
Numerous empirical studies examined the behavior of the genders in the labor market, including participation, unemployment, unionization, wage structure, wage differentials, discrimination, segregation(e.g., Blau and Ferber, 1992; Jacobsen, 1994; Asplund and Pereira, 1999; Blau and Kahn, 2003) . However, very little empirical research on these issues has been done using Israeli data (Neuman and Weisberg, 1998; Neuman and Oaxaca, 2003) . This paper aims to contribute toward filling this gap. Also, one of the main contributions of this paper is the application of a new proposed methodology of correction for gender/ethnic selectivity at the stage of entrance into the occupation. We therefore focus on a specific occupational category.
We chose to focus on professional workers assuming that it is a relatively high-status occupation where barriers to entrance might exist, and they should be accounted for (while they probably do not exist in an occupation such as laborers). The most recent Israeli Census of Population and Housing (1995) is used to examine male and female professional workers. Characteristics and wage equations are investigated in Section III, wage decompositions and selection effects in Section IV, and concluding remarks in Section V.
In order not to confuse gender and ethnic differences, gender differences are exam- Reference to professional workers only results in more homogeneous groups, however there is still a diversity of occupations within the professional occupation (25 two-digit occupations).
II. Methodology
To determine the contributions of endowments, discrimination and selectivity in the gender wage gap, the selectivity-corrected wage equations are decomposed. There appear to be several alternatives for decomposition (Neuman and Oaxaca, 2004 ) and the various options are compared and discussed, including policy implications. The decomposition methodology we employ incorporates selection effects in estimating gender wage differentials in professional employment. We will briefly summarize the methodology. For a more comprehensive discussion of the selection decomposition methodology see Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) .
We employ a two equation model of wage determination and occupational employment among employed workers. Let the occupational employment and wage functions for professionals be given by
4 where E * i is a latent variable associated with being employed in a professional occupation, H 0 i , is a vector of determinants of occupational employment, Y i is the market wage (in logs) for professionals, X 0 i is a vector of determinants of market wages, γ and β are the associated parameter vectors, and ε i and u i are i.i.d error terms that are assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution (0, 0, σ ε , σ u , ρ).
The probability of being employed in a professional occupation is given by
where Φ(·) is the standard normal C.D.F. (the variance of ε is normalized to 1).
Wages are observed for those for whom E * i > 0, so that the expected wage of a worker observed to be employed as a professional is given by
, and φ (·) is the standard normal density function. The estimating equation for those employed professionals may be expressed as
We are interested in decomposing the gender wage gap among professionals in the presence of sample selectivity:
where the parameters of (5) are estimated by the Heckman procedure separately for males and females. It follows from (5) that correction for selectivity bias requires a 5 wage decomposition of the following sort:
where b β * is an estimated nondiscriminatory wage structure apart from selectivity effects. The first two terms in 6 correspond to pure favoritism toward males and pure discrimination against females, the third term is the human capital component. The last term measures the contribution of selection effects to the observed gender wage gap.
A choice has to be made as to which wage structure is to be regarded as the nondiscriminatory standard. Three possibilities that come to mind are the estimated male wage structure ³ b β * =β m´, the estimated female wage structure
=β f´, and a pooled Neumark/Oaxaca-Ransom wage structure 1 . Because of the familiar index number problem these choices do not imply the same estimates of discrimination and endowment effects. In particular using the estimated male wage structure as the norm assumes that all of the discrimination against women is attributable to favoritism toward men whereas using the estimated female wage structure assumes that all of the discrimination against women is pure discrimination. In terms of practical application for correcting gender salary inequities, the use of the female wage structure as the equity standard presents potential problems of implementation associated with legal restrictions and employee morale (see Oaxaca and Ransom, 2003) . Consequently, we follow much of the literature and adopt the estimated male wage structure as the nondiscriminatory norm. In our case this yields the following decomposition:
The first two terms in (7) are the familiar discrimination and human capital components. The last term measures the contribution of selection effects to the observed gender wage gap. We shall refer to (6) as Decomposition #1. This decomposition is noncommittal regarding the role of selection effects in labor market discrimination.
Consequently, Decomposition #1 offers little in the way of policy implications beyond the elimination of wage discrimination against employed female professional workers.
This is because the only term that is explicitly associated with labor market inequity is the first term that reflects gender differences in the returns to the observable characteristics. Everything else is either identified as endowments or are lumped together in the neutral sounding category of selectivity.
One approach found in the literature is to simply net out the selection effects from the observed wage gap:
Examples of this approach may be found in Duncan and Leigh (1980) , Reimers (1983) and Boymond et.al. (1994) . While (8) is a decomposition of the selectivity corrected wage differential, it does not provide a decomposition of the observed wage differential
To move beyond simply accounting for selection effects requires some assumptions about what constitutes inequity in selection effects. Given such assumptions the selection term in (7) can be further decomposed in several alternative ways. Accordingly, gross selection effects can be decomposed in the following manner: 
The effects of gender differences in the wage response to the probability of professional employment are captured by the term ( b θ m − b θ f ) b λ f . Equivalently, this last term reflects the wage gap effects of gender differences in the correlation between the selectivity equation error term and the wage equation error term as well as gender differences in wage variability. As shown in Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) this last term could be further decomposed into gender differences in ρ and σ u if desired.
How should the components of (9) be allocated to discrimination and endowments?
One possibility is to include the effects of gender differences in θ in the estimated endowment (human capital) effects, and to include in the discrimination component gender differences in the estimated γ parameters from the probit selection equation for professional employment. In this case the overall wage decomposition is given by
We shall refer to the decomposition defined by (10) as Decomposition #2. Antidiscrimination policy would entail the elimination of hiring discrimination against females seeking employment as professionals in addition to the elimination of wage discrimination against already employed female professional workers.
The most encompassing view of discrimination would be to regard gender differences in the estimated γ parameters from the probit selection equation for professional employment and gender differences in the wage effects of selectivity (θ) as 8 manifestations of discrimination. Gender differences in the values of the occupation determining variables (H 0 ) would be treated as nondiscriminatory endowment effects.
These assumptions lead to the following decomposition:
We refer to the decomposition defined by (11) as Decomposition #3. Policy implications beyond those appropriate to Decomposition #3 are difficult to envision. The problem is how to operationalize equal returns to professional employment selectivity.
Given that the θ parameters are the products of ρ 1 and σ u 1 , it is even a challenge to make the case that gender differences in the correlation between the selectivity equation error term and the wage equation error term results from labor market discrimination. It may be equally difficult to make the case that gender differences in the standard deviation of the wage equation error term are necessarily signs of labor market discrimination.
An alternative would simply be to regard gender differences in the wage effects of selectivity as a separate selectivity contribution:
We refer to the decomposition defined by (12) as Decomposition #4. For this decomposition the policy implications are the same as for decomposition #2.
A possible objection to the Decompositions #2, #3, and #4 is the interpretation of gender differences in γ as manifestations of labor market discrimination. The parameter vector γ presumably reflects supply side as well as demand side valuations of personal characteristics pertaining to occupational outcomes. Also, gender differences in γ actually reflect differences in σ ε even though σ ε is not identified and is normalized to 1 for convenience. Should gender differences in σ ε be regarded as discriminatory? are more educated than their male co-workers), there is occupational segregation, whereby women are employed in less prestigious occupations and their wages are significantly lower. Gender differences in wages and in occupational segregation are more pronounced than ethnic differences despite the fact that the educational levels between the genders are more equal.
III. Women and Men in the Israeli
Male workers have somewhat more (potential) experience than female workers (by 1-2 years) 4 and work longer hours per week (about 6 hours more). There are minor (2000) . The Krashinsky study uses data on a sample of twins and finds that unlike the standard human capital variables and union effects, marital status does not significantly affect wages after selection is accounted for. This finding is an example of the point made in Heckman (1979) that variables that may have no direct effect on wages may appear to do so if they are operating at the sample selection stage.
The lure of simplicity has to be weighed against the possible consequences of identification problems associated with the Heckman method. Accordingly, our results reported below have to be viewed with the usual caveats.
Selection Equations
We now examine the respective probabilities of employment in the professional occupations. Probit models are estimated in which the dependent variable takes on the value of 1 if the worker is employed in the professional occupations and 0 if the worker is employed in other occupations. 6 The estimates of the probit regressions are used to construct the Inverse Mills Ratio for the purpose of correcting professional hourly wage equations for selection bias and are reported in Table 2 . Predictably, schooling has a major positive effect on the probability of being 6 Non-employed individuals are excluded from the sample. 14 employed as a professional worker for all groups. Age has parabolic effects that vary across groups. Over a normal working life age generally exhibits a positive effect on the probability of professional employment for all groups; however for women the age effect is increasing whereas for men it is declining. Married Westerners have a higher probability of professional employment. For Eastern workers the effect is insignificant.
Number of children was never statistically significant and was subsequently dropped without altering any of the basic conclusions. Male workers not born in Israel have a lower tendency to work as professionals while female workers not born in Israel have a greater propensity to be employed as professionals. City of residence is generally statistically significant for women but not generally so for men. The effect of the size of locality of residence is generally significant for women and Western men, but not so for Eastern men.
Wage Equations Mincer-type wage equations corrected for selectivity in professional occupation are estimated in order to study the wage structure of each gender (by ethnic group). These equations are later used to calculate the share of the human capital (explained) component versus the discrimination (unexplained) component and the selectivity component in explaining wage differentials between the various groups. In all wage regressions (Table 3) , the logarithm of individual hourly wages is regressed against the following explanatory variables: dummy variables representing the highest educational certificate obtained, years of potential work experience (age -years of schooling -6), experience squared, a dummy variable for foreign born, the length of residence in Israel, dummy variables for city and size of locality and the economic sector in which the worker is employed (a series of dummy variables for one-digit economic sectors).
The results of the regressions conform to the results found in numerous other studies: earnings are increasing with the (higher) degree or certificate obtained, the re-lationship between earnings and experience has the inverted U-shape, and length of residence in Israel is positively related to earnings. 7 The magnitudes of the effects of the various explanatory variables on earnings are less straightforward. There are gender differences in the returns to the human capital variables. Returns to experience are larger for men than for women, as well as to years of residence in Israel.
On the other hand the returns to education and to the size of locality are higher for women, and the wage penalty associated with being foreign born is smaller for women.
There are also differences between the ethnic groups. Educational attainment has a stronger effect on the wages of Easterners. The wage penalty for not being Israeli born is higher for Westerners. The overall picture shows that returns to education are higher for subordinate groups of workers, while returns to experience and residence (experience in the labor market) are higher in the superior group. For experience (potential) and residence in the country, the reverse pattern is found:
Western men show the highest returns to both experience (0.052) and per year of residence (0.006). The other three groups have lower and very similar returns.
7 It should be noted that the length of residence in the country is one of the elements of human capital, since it presumably measures the degree of understanding of the operation of the local labor market and also, which is most important, the command of the spoken language, i.e., the ability to communicate verbally. (On language and earnings, see Chiswick and Miller (1995) ).
Empirical studies for other countries give mixed results. For example, in a series of papers on returns to education in 15 European countries (Asplund and Pereira, 1999), the rates of return are higher for men in several countries (Denmark, Finland and France). In Greece and Italy, they are higher for women and, in Germany, returns are higher for women in one of the samples but lower in the others.
Selection Estimates A sense of the role of selection effects in determining wages can be determined from Table 4 which presents the estimates of the averages of the IMR variable (λ) and the respective coefficients of this variable in the wage equations (θ). The coefficient of λ is negative and statistically significant in all cases. Since λ is inversely related to the probability of employment in the professional occupation, a negative coefficient indicates that (cet. par.) workers with higher probabilities of being employed in the professional occupation will earn higher wages conditional upon employment in the professional occupation.
The estimates of λ are higher for women and for Easterners which is consistent with the lower probabilities for members of these groups being employed as professionals.
Adopting the estimated probit coefficients of males (Westerners) further increases the value of λ for females (Easterners). This implies that the probit weights for females (Easterners) favor higher probabilities of professional employment compared with the probit weights for males (Westerners). Furthermore, the personal characteristics of females (Easterners) favor lower probabilities of professional employment compared with the personal characteristics of males (Westerners). Table 5 presents the decomposition for the various comparisons. There are five decomposition corresponding to each comparison. First as a benchmark is the standard Oaxaca (1973) decomposition technique. This is followed by the four decompositions incorporating selection effects. We label the selectivity corrected decompositions decomposition #1 -decomposition #4 corresponding to expressions (7), (10), (11) Selection contributes to a narrowing of the observed gender wage gap among West-erners. This is attributable to the fact that the wage effect of λ is more negative for
IV. Decomposition of Wage Differentials and the Role of Selectivity
, and the estimated Western male selection equation lowers the probability of professional employment for the average Western female pro-
. What this means is that the conditional mean value of the wage equation error term for professional workers is lower on average for Western men than for Western Women. In other words relatively higher earnings potential women are employed in the professional occupations. This is in contrast to the ethnic comparisons and the gender comparison among Easterners. For example, the conditional mean value of the wage equation error term for professional workers is higher on average for Westerners (Eastern men) than Easterners (Eastern women).
In other words selection increases the observed ethnic (Eastern gender) wage gap because relatively lower earnings potential Easterners (Eastern women) are employed in the professional occupations. For the ethnic comparison among men, selection has a partial negative impact on the wage gap in decomposition #1 ((
overall this is more than offset by the other components of the selection decomposition
Within any comparison group in Table 5 , the estimated discrimination and endowment components can vary a great deal as a result of the imputation of gender differences in the selectivity term. Because of the different possible imputations of decomposition components of gender differences in selectivity effects, estimates of discrimination and endowment effects can vary widely even if the overall gender difference in the selectivity term is relatively modest. For example, the contribution of overall gender differences in selectivity effects is only -5.41% of the total gender wage gap among Westerners. Yet discrimination can account from 38% to 67% of the overall wage gap. This variation is not simply statistical variation but rather the consequence of what one chooses to label as discrimination (or endowments). In our sample women are less likely to be employed in the professional occupations, though the estimated coefficients on the determinants of professional employment favor women. If a policy maker were primarily interested in direct salary equity rather than selection effects, decomposition #1 would provide the relevant target adjustments. Note that this does not completely ignore the effects of selectivity because the implied estimates of discrimination are generally different from what they would be under the standard Oaxaca decomposition which does not control for selectivity.
Successful implementation of policies using decomposition #1 as a guideline would raise the wages of women relative to men and would raise the wages of Eastern men relative to Western men.
V. Concluding Remarks
The presence of selection effects narrows the observed gender wage gap among professionally employed Westerners but raises the gender gap among Easterners. On the other hand selection effects reduce the observed ethnic wage gap among professionally employed men but raise the ethnic wage gap among professionally employed women. Without exception, gender and ethnic differences in the characteristics determining selection into professional employment serve to diminish the observed wage gaps. Also without exception, gender and ethnic differences in the probit selection equation parameters serve to widen the observed wage gaps. Any anti-discrimination policy directed at muting gender and ethnic differences in the weights placed on characteristics that determine selection into professional employment would first have to identify how much of the parameter differences can be associated with supply side influences and how much represent unequal access to professional employment. This is no easy task.
If one sets aside the contribution of the estimated selection effects to the observed wage differentials (decomposition #1), generally the estimated discrimination component is the highest. In this case the emphasis for anti-discrimination policy would 20 be on wage structure for professionals. The only exception is for ethnic differentials among women. Here the largest unexplained gaps occur for decompositions #2 and #4. Here the difference is that decomposition #2 assigns all of the selection contributions to either discrimination or endowments while decomposition #4 identifies the selection effect as stemming solely from differences in the IMR on professional wages.
What this paper has shown is that in addition to gender differences exceeding ethnic differences, selection effects do impact estimates of labor market discrimination. At 
